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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
t

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent, :
v.

i

JAMES FRANK WILCOX,

i

Case No.
Court of Appeals No. 920031-CA
Category No. 13

Defendant-Petitioner. :
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
INTRODUCTION
Defendant was charged with one count of unlawful
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1991); and one count of unlawful possession of
a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). He filed a pretrial motion to
1) suppress the physical evidence on the basis that the affidavit
supporting the search warrant in his case was insufficient, and
2) discover the identity of the confidential informant who
provided grounds for the affidavit.

That motion was denied.

Defendant filed a petition for permission to appeal the
denial of his motion in the Utah Court of Appeals.

That petition

was denied on March 6, 1992. Petitioner now seeks review by writ
of certiorari of the court of appeals' denial of permission to
pursue an interlocutory appeal.

ARGUMENT
CERTIORARI HAS NOT BEEN PROPERLY SOUGHT;
CONSEQUENTLY, IT SHOULD BE DENIED.
Petitioner titles this petition as a petition for writ
of certiorari; however, the body of the petition appears to be a
request for an interlocutory appeal in this Court on issues which
the Utah Court of Appeals declined to address on interlocutory
appeal in that court.

This petition is devoid of any mention of

the "character of reasons" which this Court considers in deciding
whether to grant certiorari.
Procedure (1992).

Rule 46, Utah Rules of Appellate

The petition does not ask this Court to

resolve conflicts between panels of the court of appeals or to
review a decision of the court of appeals which has departed
"from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings" or
to review a decision of the court of appeals on an important
issue "which has not been, but should be, settled" by this Court.
Id.

Instead, petitioner asks this Court to review a decision of

the district court which the court of appeals refused to review
on interlocutory appeal.
The decision to grant or deny permission to file an
interlocutory appeal is discretionary with the appellate courts.
Because petitioner's charges do not involve first degree or
capital felonies, appellate jurisdiction over his case resides in
the Utah Court of Appeals.
(1992).

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)

That court did not abuse its discretion by denying

petitioner's request for interlocutory appeal.
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In Manwill v.

Ovlei , L I III d fi ,!d 4 .! .1,

I h J, IP , .-"ill j 7 7" (1 y h 1 ) , I h i. s C o u r t

explained

the purpose of an interlocutory appeal:
T h e p u r p o s e t o b e served j n g r a n t i n g a n
i n t e r l o c u t o r y a p p e a l is t o g e t d i r e c t l y a t

and dispose of the issues as quickly as
possible consistent with thoroughness and
efficiency in the administration of justice.
But that objective is not always served by
granting such an appeal. In some instances,
the necessity of remanding for trial may
result in protracting rather than shortening
the litigation. For this reason, whenever it
appears likely that the matters in dispute
can be finally disposed of upon a trial; or
where they may become moot; or where they
canf without involving any serious
difficulty, abide determination in the event
of an appeal after the trial, the desired
objective is best served by refusing to
entertain an interlocutory appeal and letting
the case proceed to trial. Then, if an
appeal is necessary, there is this additional
advantage: the issues of facts have been
determined and the record is viewed in the
light most favorable to the judgment, instead
of the reverse.
Id. .,it; 178,
c a s e I;.",1 pfc

The court: of appeals' deci a i on l" Allow pv1 i t iruei w
• *JI

the issues

achieves the purpose set out in Manwill;

without serious difficulty, await

determination

on appeal after trial.
Tli i s i s especially true since the court of appeals has
resolved these issues adversely

petitioner in an opinion filed

two days after petitioner fi •••
the present case.
App. March .
present cas*

petilion Ioi certiorari **

State v. Purser, Case No. 910348-CA (Ui ai

1992),

*

nearly identical factually to the
ion is „:n tached)

e

affi davits and warrants are factually similar and the issues
raised by Purser (who was represented by i no flier mpinhor «" Scill1
-3-

Lake Legal Defenders Association and who entered a conditional
guilty plea before appealing the suppression ruling) are the
issues raised by petitioner.

The court of appeals has addressed

the issues raised by petitioner and resolved them against
petitioner's position.
CONCLUSION
This petition does not properly present a case for
issuance of a writ of certiorari; though titled a petition for
writ of certiorari, the petition is really a request for this
Court to entertain an interlocutory appeal on a trial court
decision which the court of appeals declined to review.

For the

foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this
Court deny the petition for writ of certiorari.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this J

day of April, 1992.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

CHARLENE BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
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ATTACHMENT

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

**Wy T. Noore**

00O00

CtorkofctheC<a«
ttoh Court <* Ap§Mfc

OPINION
(For Publication)

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No. 910348-CA

v.
Jerry Leon Purser,

F I L E D
(March 1 1 , 1992)

Defendant and Appellant.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup
Attorneys:

Lynn R. Brown and Ronald S. Fujino, Salt Lake City,
for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and J. Kevin Murphy, Salt Lake City,
for Appellee

Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Russon.
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:
Jerry Leon Purser appeals the trial court's denial of his
motion to suppress evidence seized under a search warrant.
Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) and
58-37-8(1)(b)(i) (1990), reserving the right to appeal the denial
of his motion to suppress. See State v. Seryf 758 P.2d 935, 939
(Utah App. 1988). We affirm.
FACTS
Narcotics detective Steve Sharp of the Salt Lake County
Sheriff's Department requested a search warrant on August 23,
1990. He submitted an affidavit relating his belief that
amphetamines, packaging and cutting materials, glassware, drug
paraphernalia and other chemicals and materials used to
manufacture a controlled substance would be found on defendant's
property.

The affidavit stated Detective Sharp had been contacted by a
confidential informant (C.I.) who reported defendant was selling
amphetamines at his residence and described defendant's person,
car and address. The C.I. stated he had observed illicit drug
use, glassware, Bunsen burners, a light yellow liquid and
chemicals inside defendant's residence during the thirty days
prior to the filing of the affidavit.
The affidavit further described how the C.I. assisted
Detective Sharp in performing two drug buys through the use of an
unwitting participant, within ten days prior to the filing of the
affidavit. The C.I. picked up the unwitting participant, gave
the unwitting participant money provided by Detective Sharp and
received amphetamines from the unwitting participant after the
unwitting participant entered the defendant's residence. The
unwitting participant told the C.I. that defendant sold the
unwitting participant the amphetamines. Detective Sharp searched
the C.I. for money and drugs before and after the controlled buys
and both the C.I. and the unwitting participant were observed
during the buys, except for the time the unwitting participant
was in defendant's residence. The C.I. received nothing for the
information or assistance.
In the affidavit, Detective Sharp described his narcotics
experience and stated that during the investigation, he observed
persons enter defendant's residence and leave after only a few
minutes, which suggested narcotics trafficking. He corroborated
defendant's identity through personal observation, police and
driver's license records and a registration check on defendant's
automobile. Police arrest records showed defendant had been
arrested for possession of a controlled substance with the intent
to distribute.
Detective Sharp requested a no knock, nighttime warrant,
stating the evidence sought could be hidden or destroyed easily
and that it would be safer for the officers to use darkness to
conceal their approach. Detective Sharp based his safety
concerns on information from the C.I. that defendant had spoken
of weapons and on Detective Sharp's observation of a sign at
defendant's house claiming: "This property insured by Smith and
Wesson•"
The no knock, nighttime search warrant was issued and
officers conducted the search at 9:12 p.m. on August 23, 1990.
The officers seized two to three thousand amphetamine tablets,
several firearms and ammunition, packaging materials, scales,
drug paraphernalia, cash, marijuana seeds and other miscellaneous
items•
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Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized, claiming
the search warrant was defective because the supporting affidavit
did not establish probable cause and did not support the no knock
or nighttime authorization. Defendant also requested the
identity of the c.I. to show the C.I* was unreliable and thus
defeat probable cause. The trial court denied both motions and
defendant appeals.
PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUPPORT SEARCH WARRANT
Defendant contends the affidavit
warrant was insufficient to establish
particular, defendant argues the C.I.
by the unwitting participant were not
because the unwitting participant was
after the purchases.

supporting the search
probable cause. In
was unreliable and the buys
reliable, controlled buys
not searched before and

Before issuing a search warrant, a neutral magistrate must
review an affidavit containing specific facts sufficient to
support a finding of probable cause. State v. Babbell. 770 P.2d
987, 990 (Utah 1989); State v. Dronebura. 781 P.2d 1303, 1304
(Utah App. 1989). The magistrate must not merely ratify the bare
conclusions of others. Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 239, 103
S. Ct. 2317, 2333 (1983); Babbell. 770 P.2d at 990-91; Dronebura.
781 P.2d at 1304. The magistrate's task is to decide "whether,
given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before
him, including the %veracity' and *basis of knowledge' of persons
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place." Gates. 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S. Ct. at 2332; see Babbell.
770 P.2d at 991; State v. Weaver. 817 P.2d 830, 832-33 (Utah App.
1991)• Upon appellate review, we examine the search warrant
affidavit "in its entirety and in a common-sense fashion," State
v. Anderson. 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1985), deferring to the
magistrate's decision on whether the search warrant is supported
by probable cause. Gates. 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S. Ct. at 2331;
Babbell. 770 P.2d at 991; Weaver. 817 P.2d at 833.
Factors to consider in determining whether probable cause
exists include an informant's veracity, reliability and basis of
knowledge. Gates. 462 U.S. at 233, 103 S. Ct. at 2329; State v.
Hansen. 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987); State v. Brown. 798 P.2d
284, 286 (Utah App. 1990). In some cases, the circumstances may
require the supporting affidavit to set forth in detail the basis
of knowledge, veracity and reliability of a person supplying
information in order to establish probable cause. State v.
Bailey. 675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah 1984). In other cases, if the
circumstances as a whole demonstrate the truthfulness of the
informant's report, a less strong showing is required. £$!• a t
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1205-06. For example, reliability and veracity are generally
assumed when the informant is a citizen who receives nothing from
the police in exchange for the information. See Bailev, 675 P.2d
at 1206; Brown, 798 P.2d at 286; State v. Strombera, 783 P.2d 54,
57-58 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied. 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).
Courts have also consistently approved the issuance of search
warrants where the informant's knowledge is based on personal
observation. See Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130; Brown. 798 P.2d at
287; Strombercr, 783 P.2d at 57. Further buttressing reliability
is the detail with which an informant describes the facts set
forth in the affidavit and independent corroboration of the
significant facts by police. See Anderson, 701 P.2d at 1102;
Bailev, 675 P.2d at 1206; Brown, 798 P.2d at 287.
In the instant case, the affidavit set forth information
from the C.I. based on the C.I.'s personal observations,
satisfying the "basis of knowledge" consideration of the
totality-of-the-circurostances test. The affidavit did not
indicate whether the C.I. had been previously reliable. However,
the circumstances as a whole indicate the C.I.'s information was
reliable. The C.I. did not receive anything in exchange for the
information provided, but rather volunteered the information to
police. In addition, the C.I. described defendant's appearance,
house, vehicle and the contents of defendant's house with detail
and Detective Sharp independently corroborated significant facts.
Detective Sharp checked defendant's address, vehicle registration
and police^ record, thereby verifying all of the information given
by the C.I,, except for the items located in defendant's house.
Detective Sharp also personally observed defendant, defendant's
house and vehicle, and noticed persons enter defendant's house
and leave shortly thereafter, which based upon his experience was
consistent with drug trafficking. "Having personally verified
all but one piece of information provided by the informant, the
officer thus had reasonable grounds to believe that the remaining
piece . . . was also true." Anderson. 701 P.2d at 1102.
Finally, the C.I. assisted officers in conducting two
purchases, yielding amphetamines in the form of cross-top pills
and a white powder, similar to those the C.I. personally observed
in defendant's residence. Officers searched the C.I. before and
after each purchase and observed the C.I. throughout. However,
because the unwitting participant was not searched, defendant
claims the buys cannot be used to verify the information given by
the C.I. The purpose of searching a participant before and after
a controlled purchase is to prevent the participant from
implicating innocent third persons in order to gain police favor
or for other personal reasons. Reves v. State. 541 So. 2d 772,
773 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). Where a person unknowingly
assists the police, the opportunity and motivation for misconduct
do not arise. !£. Accordingly, courts have found probable cause
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where the unwitting participant is not searched and disappears
within the residence for a short period of time. See Delaado v.
State. 556 So. 2d 514, 516 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Reves. 541
So. 2d at 773; State v. Hawkins. 278 N.W.2d 750, 751-52 (Minn.
1979).
In defendant's case, we need not question the unwitting
participant's reliability and veracity because the unwitting did
not knowingly participate in the controlled purchases and acted
against his/her own penal interest in making the purchase.
Additionally, officers watched the unwitting participant
continuously, with the exception of the short time the unwitting
participant was in defendant's residence.
Therefore, we conclude, based on the totality of the
circumstances, that the affidavit established probable cause to
believe drugs would be found at defendant's residence.
NO KNOCK, NIGHTTIME SEARCH WARRANT
Defendant contends the no knock, nighttime warrant was not
justified because the evidence sought included drug manufacturing
devices that could not be disposed of easily. Utah Code Ann.
S 77-23-10 (1990) provides that a no knock warrant is justified
only upon proof "that the object of the search may be quickly
destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or that physical harm may
result to any person if notice were given." In addition, the
warrant must be served in the daytime unless the affidavit
supports a finding that a nighttime search is necessary "to seize
the property prior to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged or
altered, or for other good reason." Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5
(1990).
Courts have allowed no knock warrants because of the concern
for destruction of evidence where "the affidavit suggests that a
small, readily disposable quantity of drugs in a residence is the
object of the search." State v. Rowe. 806 P.2d 730, 733 (Utah
App.)(amphetamines and marijuana), cert. grantedr 817 P.2d 327
(Utah 1991); see also State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1367 (Utah
App.)(marijuana plants), cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987).
Where larger quantities of drugs or allegations of drug
manufacturing are involved, the destruction justification may be
less persuasive. However, because of the danger involved in
dealing with those who are engaged in large-scale drug
manufacturing and distribution, no knock, nighttime warrants are
justified to allow officers the advantage of surprise, thus
protecting their safety. See State v. Lien. 265 N.W.2d 833, 839
(Minn. 1978); State v. Valento. 405 N.W.2d 914, 919-20 (Minn. Ct.
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App. 1987). Courts have approved nighttime searches, allowing
officers the cover of darkness, if there are specific facts
indicating the occupant may be armed or dangerous. See United
States v, Prvor. 652 F. Supp. 1353, 1364 (D. Me. 1987); People v.
Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d 480, 749 P.2d 803, 244 Cal. Rptr. 148, cert.
denied. 488 U.S. 871, 109 S. Ct. 188 (1988).
In the instant case, the officers were searching for
amphetamines, in the form of pills and powder; packaging and
cutting materials; drug paraphernalia; glassware; and other
materials used to manufacture a controlled substance. Detective
Sharp observed persons entering defendant#s house and leaving
after only a few minutes, indicating drug trafficking. The C.I.
reported that defendant spoke of weapons and Detective Sharp
observed a sign stating: "This property insured by Smith and
Wesson.11 Thus, the affidavit set forth evidence of easily
disposable drugs, talk and signs of weapons and evidence that the
residence was being used as a drug outlet. The officers were
searching for evidence that either could be easily hidden or
destroyed, or that demonstrated possible danger to the officers.
In addition, officers executed the warrant in the evening at a
time when previous purchases took place and when defendant was
likely to be home. Therefore, we conclude based on the facts in
the affidavit, the no knock, nighttime warrant was justified.1
1. We distinguish the affidavit in this case from that in Rowe,
806 P.2d 730. In Rowe. we held that checking a box next to a
preprinted recital that evidence could easily be disposed of and
harm to officers could result from notice, by itself, was not
sufficient to justify a nighttime search. In contrast to Rowe,
the affidavit in the present case set forth specific facts
demonstrating the danger to officers and the advantages of a nowarning search under cover of darkness. In addition, the
officers searched at 9:12 p.m. in August, as opposed to 11:50
p.m. in Rowe. not at a time when the occupants of the house would
likely be asleep and tend to overreact to a forceful entry.
We have not found any Utah statutes or cases defining
"nighttime.11 There are generally three views for determining
what time is "nighttime.ff The first view requires a factual
determination of whether there is sufficient natural light that
one can distinguish a person's features. See, e.g.. State v.
Burnside. 113 Idaho 65, 741 P.2d 352, 356 (1987). The second
view defines nighttime according to sunrise and sunset. See,
e.g.. Grant v. Hass. 31 Tex. Civ. App. 688, 75 S.W. 342, 343
(1903)(daytime is thirty minutes before sunrise to thirty minutes
after sunset). The last view sets forth specific hours for
execution of a search warrant without special authorization.
See, e.g.. Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(h) (6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m.). We
(continued.•.)

£

DISCLOSURE OF C.I. AND UNWITTING PARTICIPANT
Finally, defendant argues that knowing the identities of the
C.I. and the unwitting participant would have helped his defense;
therefore, the identities should be disclosed. Defendant did not
seek disclosure of the unwitting participant's identity in the
trial court and we will not consider the issue raised for the
first time on appeal. State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 77 (Utah App.
1990). As to the C.I., if defendant had been prosecuted for the
transactions involving the C.I., and disclosure was "essential
*to assure a fair determination of the issues,'w State v.
Forshee, 611 P.2d 1222, 1224 (Utah 1980), disclosure would be
required. However, defendant was not prosecuted based on the
transactions involving the C.I. Defendant was prosecuted for
possession with intent to distribute based on the items found
when the search warrant was executed. Thus the controlled
purchases in the affidavit were not in issue and were relevant
only to the question of probable cause to support the search
warrant.
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly stated that "courts will
not compel disclosure of the identity of an informant, who has
supplied probable cause for the issuance of a warrant, where
disclosure is sought merely to aid in attacking probable cause"
by attacking the reliability of the informant. State v.
Bankhead. 30 Utah 2d 135, 514 P.2d 800, 802 (1973); accord McCrav
v. State, 386 U.S. 300, 305, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 1059 (1967); State
v. Sessions. 583 P.2d 44, 45 (Utah 1978). Therefore, because
defendant requested disclosure merely to challenge statements
made in the affidavit supporting the search warrant, we conclude
the trial court appropriately denied the request.
In conclusion, we hold there were sufficient facts in the
affidavit in support of the search warrant to establish probable
cause and to justify a no knock, nighttime warrant. Furthermore,
we find no error in the trial court's refusal to disclose the

1. (...continued)
do not reach this issue because it was not briefed and we find
the nighttime search was justified in this case.
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identity of the C.I. Therefore, we affirm defendant's
convictions.

Judith M. Billings,
Associate Presiding Judge

WE CONCUR:

Russell W. Bench, Judge

Leonard H. Russon, Judge
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